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Executive Summary 
 
i. While political events have dominated the headlines on Nepal, a significant subtext is the 
effort by senior technocrats over the past few years to keep the ship of state afloat.  Through 
efforts to craft and implement the PRSP and to strengthen the budget system, a small group 
of senior technocrats have sought to sustain and lay the foundations for improved public 
sector performance through a set of pragmatic reforms. 
 
ii. Yet unfolding political events threaten economic prospects and fiscal stability in the 
country.  With security expenditure to combat a violent insurgency claiming a growing share 
of resources, Nepal faces the risk that declining economic performance will reduce domestic 
revenue intake as well as donor support.  The consequence of such a trend would be to crowd 
out expenditure critical for sustaining development and thereby continue a vicious circle of 
economic decline.   
 
iii. The PRSP provides, in part, a basis for stemming this tide, by articulating the government’s 
intention to revive growth, improve service delivery, promote social inclusion and improve 
governance.  Over the past few years government policy in the PRS has emphasized a 
transfer of resources to support rural and human capital development, including in areas 
where the insurgency poses a threat to livelihoods.  However, implementation of this vision 
will depend critically on extraordinary political leadership and effective management of 
public resources.  Private sector confidence and, therefore, economic recovery will depend on 
evidence of the government’s ability to link PRS objectives and resource allocation to the 
creation of public infrastructure and improved delivery of key public services.  Both domestic 
revenue and foreign assistance trends must be stabilized and strengthened by resolute actions 
that demonstrate strategic policy making, budgeting and implementation.  This is a difficult 
challenge in the midst of an insurgency that constrains and threatens government operations 
in many parts of the country.  A number of steps will have to be taken to confront these 
challenges. 
 
iv. Fiscal Management: Nepal does not presently have a large fiscal deficit but preliminary 
simulations of potential economic shocks suggest that in the medium term Nepal could face 
debt servicing difficulties. The budget system has demonstrated its ability to maintain fiscal 
discipline.  But, given the demand for greater expenditure on security functions and 
uncertainty regarding revenue and aid, maintaining fiscal balance and an appropriate 
composition of expenditure is becoming a more problematic issue.  The government is faced 
with the possibility of either a growing fiscal deficit or a public service deficit.  This raises 
questions about the appropriate fiscal strategy under the circumstances.  Should the 
government accommodate to the fiscal deficit through additional borrowing or should it seek 
to contain it, and if so how?  Should the adjustment be on the revenue side or through 
expenditure rationalization?  Can the government make more efficient use of existing donor 
commitments?  Can access to predictable external grant resources be increased to sustain 
productive expenditure?  How can efficiency of public spending be improved? 
 
v. A clearly articulated medium term fiscal strategy would be helpful both in building 
domestic understanding and reinforcing political commitment to realistic fiscal limits.  It 
would also provide a useful basis to engage donors and the international financial institutions 
(IFIs) on their support for the strategy.  A fiscal strategy that banks on raising substantial 
sustainable domestic revenues would be difficult under current circumstances of low 
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economic growth in a conflict environment.  Therefore, the strategy must rely on a three-
pronged effort based on expenditure rationalization, enhanced external assistance and some 
limited domestic borrowing.  While every effort should be made to enhance predictable donor 
support for the budget, it would make sense for the government to consider a significant 
expenditure rationalization both to ensure that priority activities are adequately financed and 
to demonstrate the political resolve to cut wasteful, low value programs and projects.  If this 
political will is demonstrated, it would also increase the prospects for attracting external grant 
support, and thus allow some fiscal stimulus to the economy.  Although current debt levels 
are above 50 percent of GDP and Nepal falls under the Highly Indebted Poor Country 
category, it may be appropriate to consider the scope to increase domestic borrowing to 
ensure counterpart funding for high value investments, although this should be undertaken on 
a limited basis and with full consideration of the macroeconomic and solvency implications 
of such borrowing.  It would be clearly preferable for the government to use grant aid rather 
than domestic borrowing, but should grant aid fall short, it may be rational to undertake 
limited borrowing in cases where the returns to raising such counterpart funding would result 
in high economic and financial returns, if this is macro-economically viable. 
 
vi. Political Engagement in the PRSP and MTEF:  From the perspective of institutional 
development, one remaining area of weakness in the PRSP and MTEF is real political 
engagement in making strategic decisions on policy and the budget.  While the unsettled 
political conditions that have prevailed over the past few years may explain both the lack of 
political engagement and the extraordinary compensating efforts of the technocrats, it is a 
weakness that must be addressed.  The need to develop a fiscal strategy offers the opportunity 
to address this weakness. Appropriate adaptations would need to be made to the budget 
process to allow for the political leadership to be informed and make judgment on the fiscal 
strategy. 
 
vii. Linking the PRSP to the MTEF/Budget:  Most countries find it difficult to ensure 
allocation of resources and implementation of budgets according to plan or policy priorities.  
Weak links in the information and accountability chain can cause a divergence between plans 
and actual allocations.  Since 2002 the Nepal government has undertaken a series of 
creditable and pragmatic actions to link the PRSP to the budget and to ensure allocations 
related to priorities.  Notably, the MTEF has been used to improve the realism of 
development budget allocations and better alignment and funding of the highest PRSP 
priorities for ministries However, the additional fact is that actual development budget 
expenditure has fallen considerably short of even this more realistic appropriation.  It is not 
clear if this underperformance reflects a problem of external financing shortfalls relative to 
what is anticipated in the budget, or whether security conditions in the country are preventing 
the execution of the development budget, or whether both factors are at play.  But the 
ultimate impact on development spending is clear:  the development budget has declined 
sharply as a share of GDP from 9 percent in 2000 to 6.3 percent in 2004 and estimated at 6.6 
percent in 2005.   
 
viii. Executing the PRSP Budget Priorities:  Under these somewhat unpredictable and 
deteriorating financial circumstances, the government has sought to ensure that a subset of 
development projects (priority one projects) are effectively executed. Specifically, the 
government has ensured: (a) full funding of all priority one projects; (b) preferential fund 
release to priority one projects early in the fiscal year; (c) performance based fund release for 
subsequent trimester release, and (d) discontinuing virement of funds among priority 
categories.  These measures have seen an improvement in implementation of priority one 
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projects.  It must be presumed that the costs of development budget cuts have been largely 
borne by lower priority projects.   
 
ix. The government is in the process of expanding the focus of the MTEF to the full budget.  
This is important to avoid the risk of an excessive emphasis on the development budget and a 
lack of focus on recurrent activities.  It is notable that whereas the PRSP is cast in terms of 
improving service delivery and social inclusion, the government has largely cast the 
implementation of the MTEF in terms of execution of priority development projects.  While 
this was justified as a sequencing decision to initiate the MTEF, it does create a lopsided 
emphasis on ensuring resource flows to investments only, rather than to ensure flows to 
major government programs and their delivery.  The sooner this distortion, which is anyway 
present in the dual budget, is corrected, the better it would be for effective implementation of 
the PRSP.  However, the integration of the regular budget in the MTEF should be 
implemented with caution with respect to the capacity of the line ministries to handle an 
increased workload associated with medium-term planning of recurrent expenditures.  This 
involves such issues as the adequacy of staffing levels and skills in macroeconomic 
forecasting and identifying spending priorities. 
 
x. Efficiency in Government:  The third area of the performance of the budget system, the 
technical efficiency of resource use, remains for all countries the most difficult area to assess 
and improve because of the dependence of performance on multiple factors – on incentives,  
skills and capabilities of staff, quality of management and supervision and the availability of 
complementary inputs.  Issues of political uncertainty, civil service management, limits on 
political interference in day-to-day operations, adherence to financial and operational 
regulations, and accountability to service recipients all have a significant impact on the 
behavior and efficiency of government departments.  A pragmatic approach to public sector 
reform will be necessary to achieve efficiency gains. For the near term, the challenge is to 
initiate a process of executing budgets to improve completion and operation of priority 
investment projects and delivery of key public services.   With regard to efficiency of public 
investment, improving the timing and quality of work planning would allow a better use of 
existing project funding during the fiscal year.   This is an achievable goal that does not 
depend on the broader challenge of improving the predictability and volume of external aid 
flows.  A second area of focus is the integration of the development and regular budgets into 
the MTEF approach so that these are seen as two aspects of a unified strategy to improve 
government services and management of assets. 
 
xi. Summary of Recommendations:  Given the rapidly evolving economic situation and its 
adverse implications for the fiscal situation, Nepal confronts challenges both of appropriate 
fiscal policy design and reforms to expenditure management that requires urgent strategic 
decisions.  Reforms to budget management via the MTEF should be adapted to ensure 
application of such a strategy while continuing reforms that enlarge the impact of better 
budget management.   
 
 Clearly, the development of a draft of the medium term fiscal strategy to underpin 
the “top down” fiscal management framework is the major challenge confronting 
Nepal in the near term.  This would enable the central agencies to anticipate major 
economic and fiscal trends over the medium term and adapt fiscal management 
accordingly.  It would serve to focus cabinet attention on fiscal strategy ahead of 
budget preparation, force cabinet members them to recognize the need for hard 
choices and engage international partners.  That would, in turn, provide the basis for a 
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credible MTEF to be prepared.  Under current fiscal circumstances, this would appear 
to be the most urgent challenge. 
 
 The preparation and implementation of sector strategies is also helpful to the MTEF 
and in conveying progress to development partners.  In primary education and in the 
health sectors, such strategies have enabled donors to confirm financial support in the 
form of sector wide adjustment programs.  Thus sector strategies could complement 
the fiscal strategy and provide a potentially virtuous circle that could improve 
government performance and credibility. 
 
 High level political engagement in the PRSP and MTEF process could be 
strengthened.  While senior technocrats have played a role in compensating for this 
lack of engagement, it is an issue that will need to be addressed if political 
understanding is to guide the policy choices in the PRSP and MTEF.   It would also 
be important for credibility vis-à-vis external partners.   
 
 The PRSP in Nepal was viewed as a distillation of broad principles of the Tenth Five 
Year Plan.  As such, it facilitates the integration of the plan/PRSP and the 
MTEF/budget.  The government might consider further ways to ensure that strategic 
economic planning is effectively reflected in future versions of the PRSP and the 
budget.  This will require consideration of how policies will be generated in the future 
and how planning may be adapted to provide the best strategic guidance as the 
country faces difficult fiscal and development challenges. Other PRSP countries such 
as Tanzania and Uganda have used sector working groups to strengthen policy 
formulation capability in the sector ministries which is then linked to the 
PRSP/MTEF.  Nepal might consider a similar approach.   
 
 The budget preparation process could be adapted to more clearly distinguish the 
resource implications of new policy and project initiatives from those due to ongoing 
commitments.  Along with an overall fiscal strategy that defines the limits to revenue, 
deficit financing and spending, this would facilitate Cabinet engagement in 
prioritization of new initiatives within agreed fiscal limits. 
 
 At the central level, it would be advisable to consolidate the formulation and 
management of both the current and capital budgets at the Ministry of Finance 
while strengthening the role of the National Planning Council in robust development 
of the macroeconomic framework, in identifying development priorities, in evaluating 
and screening investment projects and in monitoring and evaluation of government 
programs and investments.   
 
 The government should continue its pragmatic approach to the MTEF. One of the 
tasks facing the government is with regard to expanding the MTEF approach to the 
full budget while deepening the processes and disciplines in the main ministries where 
service delivery outcomes are most critical.  Identifying major programs that 
contribute to priority PRSP service delivery goals would help integrate the recurrent 
and capital budget preparation and execution. On the other hand, ongoing initiatives 
such as activity costing and performance budgeting which are very capacity intensive 
should be deferred until the circumstances are more appropriate for such high level 
reforms.  Pragmatic goals such as improved work planning for public investment 
projects would deliver more tangible results in terms of effective use of available 
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resources, including existing donor commitments, and completion of priority projects.  
Ensuring appropriate funding of operations for key public services would also be an 
appropriate goal that would be achievable.  Monitoring and reporting on progress in 
implementing the budget would be important to sustain such progress and to restore 
the confidence of the public and development partners in the effective use of 
resources. 
   
Reforms Under Fiscal Stress 
 
A Policy Note on the Priorities for Budget Reform in Nepal 
 
This note, first of the several on fiscal management and policy option notes planned, provides 
a concise assessment of the achievements to date of the ongoing reforms to budget 
management in Nepal and concludes with some guidance on the key focus areas of fiscal 
policy and expenditure management over the near and medium term.  It is a selective 
assessment that looks at major aspects of the policy and budget process with a view to 
identifying areas for strategic focus, rather than a detailed rendering of the reforms.  The note 
highlights the fiscal challenges that are assuming increasing prominence and which must be 
addressed by policy decisions and medium term reforms.  While recognizing the uniqueness 
of Nepal’s initial conditions, capacities and current security related challenges, the note takes 
account of international experience in implementing such reforms.  The note starts with the 
economic and political background. The second section reviews fiscal trends and outlines 
issues to be considered by a fiscal strategy.  The third section discusses institutional issues to 
strengthen the budget process.  
 
1. Background 
 
1.1 With a population of 24 million, per capita GDP of around $250 and 31 percent of the 
population below the poverty line, Nepal faces significant challenges to reducing poverty 
through growth and improved equity.  Per capita income growth was 2.45 percent between 
1985 and 1999 compared to 0.8 percent in the earlier two decades
1
. A number of social 
indicators improved over this period, including the literacy rate, rates of child immunization, 
and percent of the population with access to safe drinking water and electricity.    
 
1.2 Economic growth in Nepal during 2000-2005 has had to contend with a difficult 
political environment.  Over the past five years, a fractious mainstream political process and 
deteriorating governance environment have allowed the gradual emergence of a Maoists 
insurgency that now poses a challenge to the nation state.  Political neglect and poor 
governance has sparked a violent Maoist uprising nationwide that has claimed more than 
13,000 lives to date.  This political turmoil has had a predictable impact on economic 
performance, with 2001-02 marking a significant low point with an actual decline in output.   
 
                                                 
1
 WDI data 
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FY 1990-2000 
(average) FY 2000-01 FY 2001-02 FY 2002-03 FY 2003-04
FY 2004-05 
(estimates)
  GDP 5 5.5 -0.6 3.1 3.5 2.5
  Inflation 8.5 2.7 2.9 4.7 4 5.7
  Forex reserves 22.7 25.1 0.8 2.2 14 3.1
Selected Economic Indicators: Growth Rate
(In Percent)
Table 1.
 
 
1.3 Despite considerable political uncertainty, and perhaps because of it, important 
reforms have taken place.  The past few years have witnessed major political upheavals, 
including the death of the king and the dismissal of democratically elected governments.  In 
this context, the main response to the economic crisis has been from the technocratic 
leadership in government where key officials have rallied to propose policies in the Tenth 
plan/PRSP to make growth and public services more inclusive to address conflict and 
poverty.  The government effectively merged Nepal’s Tenth Plan with the PRSP thereby 
avoiding potential conflict in objectives and instruments.  The PRS’s four broad pillars are: 
(i) generating equitable and broad based growth; (ii) improving service delivery; (iii) 
promoting social inclusion, and (iv) improving governance.   
 
1.4 To support the implementation of the PRS, the government introduced: (i) the Medium 
Term Expenditure Framework (MTEF) which links the PRS to the budget; (ii) reforms in 
education, health, financial sector, and anti-corruption/governance programs; (iii) Immediate 
Action Plan (IAP) – a list of must complete actions in fiscal year, and (iv) devolved selected 
centrally controlled activities to local bodies under Local Self Governance Act, among others.   
 
1.5 Implementation of the PRSP has had to content with continued disruptions in the 
political/security environment and related strains on public financing.  Given the current 
political circumstances, the strategy has had to contend with restraining the pressure of 
security expenditure on aggregate spending, while simultaneously seeking to improve the 
allocation of resources to areas identified as priority by the PRS.  
 
2. Public Finance Trends and Challenges 
 
2.1 Nepal’s expenditure and revenue effort is similar to some other low income 
economies.  As a share of GDP, Nepal’s average expenditure and revenue in recent years 
have averaged about 19 percent and 12 percent, respectively, compared to Guatemala’s 13 
and 11 percent, Tanzania’s 15 and 11 percent, and Uganda’s 21 percent and 11 percent.  
While Uganda raises about the same share of GDP in revenue as Nepal, it has been able to 
maintain a higher share of expenditure and fiscal deficits because of the larger share of aid it 
receives in grants.  Net of grants, Uganda has a deficit comparable to Nepal.  Sri Lanka and 
Pakistan have significantly higher revenue and expenditure, although the level of these 
countries’ foreign financing is comparable with Nepal’s (Table 2). 
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Period 
(1990-
2000) 2001 2002 2003
Period 
(1990-
2000) 2001 2002 2003
Period 
(1990-
2000) 2001 2002 2003
Revenue 10.0 11.9 11.9 12.3 16.9 15.6 17.1 17.5 9.3 10.6 11.5 11.2
Domestic Borrowing 1.5 3.0 3.6 2.6 4.9 2.5 3.9 2.3 0.4 0.6 0.2 0.1
Foreign Financing 4.7 4.6 3.4 3.5 2.4 3.6 3.5 2.6 7.5 9.3 11.1 10.0
Expenditure 16.6 19.4 19.1 18.4 22.9 21.6 23.1 22.4 16.3 20.8 22.8 21.4
Per Capita Income ($)/1 212.2 245.8 238.9 240.9 503.4 528.0 532.0 546.1 211.5 261.2 271.4 276.5
Period 
(1990-
2000) 2001 2002 2003
Period 
(1990-
2000) 2001 2002
Period 
(1990-
2000) 2001 2002 2003
Revenue 9.6 10.7 11.3 11.1 11.2 11.2 11.4 19.09 16.6 16.5 15.7
Domestic Borrowing 0.1 0.6 0.5 0.0 0.0 5.6 8.8 8 4.5
Foreign Financing 1.9 0.7 1.2 3.2 4.5 4.2 1.9 1.03 0.6 2.9
Expenditure 10.9 12.9 12.2 13.1 13.7 15.8 15.4 26.9 26.1 25.4 23.7
Per Capita Income ($)/1 1584.1 1689.7 1683.1 1674.7 258.7 280.0 294.0 737.3 858.4 879.5 920.6
/1 Constant 2000 US $
Guatemala Tanzania Sri Lanka
Table 2.
Comparative Fiscal Indicators for Selected Countries
( In Percent of GDP)
Nepal Pakistan Uganda
 
 
2.2 While aggregate revenue and expenditure have been relatively stable, the 
composition of expenditure has changed significantly.  The share of security expenditure 
in Nepal has doubled since 2000, from 1.7 percent of GDP to over 3.4 percent of GDP.  This 
trend has clearly caused a crowding out of other productive expenditure and is a major factor 
in the current fiscal situation.  It is useful to review how other countries have dealt with the 
fiscal consequences of the need to allocate greater resources to security. Uganda also faces an 
internal insurgency as do other countries such as Colombia and Sri Lanka. 
 2.3 Fiscal Policy Issues. In the second half of the 1990s, Nepal financed total expenditure of 
18 percent of GDP through revenues of 11 percent, foreign financing of about 5 percent of 
GDP and the rest through domestic borrowing which averaged 1.8 percent of GDP.  Regular 
expenditure was successfully limited to 9 percent of GDP, allowing development expenditure 
of 9 percent.   
2.4 Since FY2000, today, the insurgency has doubled expenditure on security to over 3.5 
percent of GDP and correspondingly increased regular expenditure to 13.5 percent of GDP.  
Faced with a weak economy, declining aid resources and increasing security expenditure, 
Nepal has managed competing claims on resources to avoid large fiscal deficits largely by 
sacrificing development expenditure.  In FY01-02, the government was able to limit the 
growth of total expenditure to 19 percent of GDP by cutting back development expenditure to 
7.5 percent of GDP.  Despite an increase in revenue intake to 12 percent of GDP, domestic 
borrowing increased to 3.6 percent of GDP to fund the deficit net of grants in FY02 (Table 
3). 
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FY96-00 FY00/01 FY01/02 FY02/03 FY03/04 FY05/06
 (Average) Actual Actual Actual Actual Budget Budget    
Mid-Year 
Amendment
Estimated 
Outcome
Budget
Revenue 11.0 11.9 11.9 12.3 12.6 13.1 13.7 13.5 14.1
Expenditure 18.0 19.4 19.1 18.4 18.0 20.8 21.4 19.1 21.9
Current 9.2 11.1 11.5 11.4 11.2 12.6 13.0 12.1 13.1
       Consumption expenditure 4.2 5.1 5.3 5.0 4.9 4.7 5.1 5.2 5.3
Capital 7.5 6.9 6.1 4.9 4.7 5.9 6.1 4.7 6.4
       Investment 2.4 2.0 1.5 1.4 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.0 1.4
Repayments 1.4 1.4 1.5 2.1 2.2 2.3 2.3 2.2 2.4
Current Account Surplus/Deficit (-) 1.9 0.7 0.4 0.9 1.4 0.5 0.7 1.4 1.0
Overall Deficit (before grants) -7.0 -7.5 -7.2 -6.1 -5.5 -7.7 -7.7 -5.6 -7.8
Overall Deficit (after grants) -5.3 -5.9 -5.6 -3.6 -3.2 -4.8 -4.8 -3.5 -4.6
Financing 7.0 7.5 7.0 6.1 5.5 7.7 7.7 5.6 7.8
   Foreign Financing 5.1 4.6 3.4 3.5 3.8 6.0 6.0 3.8 5.7
       Grants 1.7 1.6 1.6 2.5 2.3 2.9 2.9 2.1 3.2
       Loans 3.4 2.9 1.8 1.0 1.5 3.2 3.2 1.7 2.5
Domestic Borrowing 1.8 3.0 3.6 2.6 1.7 1.7 1.7 1.8 2.0
Memo Items:
Total Expenditure 18.0 19.4 19.0 18.5 18.2 20.8 21.4 19.1 21.9
   Regular expenditure 8.9 10.4 11.5 12.1 11.9 12.0 12.7 12.5 12.9
       o/w security 1.7 2.4 3.2 3.3 3.2 2.9 3.3 3.5 3.4
   Development expenditure 9.1 9.0 7.5 6.4 6.3 8.8 8.8 6.6 9.0
       Aid (% of  Development expenditure) 56.5 50.7 45.7 54.7 61.0 68.5 68.5 57.7 63.8
Pro-poor Spending (% of Total) 30.3 29.7 28.4 30.6 34.0 34.0 31.1 34.3
FY04/05
Pre - PRS
Table 3.
Government Operation 2001-2005
(In Percent of GDP)
PRS
 
2.5 Since FY03, the government adopted a two-pronged approach of rationalization of public 
spending and increased tax effort to arrest the rise in fiscal deficit.  Revenue as percent of 
GDP has increased further to an estimated 13.5 percentage point of GDP. The government 
has been less successful in restoring donor finance to the late 1990s level, although it could 
be claimed that a sharper decline has been averted.  The expenditure adjustment took place 
largely through the cutback in development expenditure that the government has been able to 
achieve. 
 
2.6 Reforms revived external financing, temporarily. Given the dependence of Nepal on 
external assistance, the government’s fiscal options are considerably influenced by trends and 
fluctuations in aid inflows.  The government was relatively successful for a period in 
restoring donor confidence by its reform actions, as indicated by the increase in concessional 
foreign financing from 3.4 percent of GDP in 2002 to 4 percent in 2005.  This, in part, 
allowed the government to reduce domestic borrowing as a source of deficit financing, which 
declined from 3.6 percent of GDP in 2002 to 1.8 percent in 2005.  However, while initial 
expectations were that aid as a share of GDP would be further enhanced in FY2005 to 6 
percent, in actual fact it is projected to decline to an estimated 3.8 percent of GDP.    
 
2.7 Nepal needs to maintain and deepen the public expenditure reforms necessary to 
restore confidence in government and its public services.  One of the key reforms that is 
important to government credibility is further development of the budget system to enable 
public policy priorities to be effectively financed and to be reflected in improved public 
sector performance and development outcomes.  In Nepal, this budget reform is articulated as 
the implementation of the MTEF  
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2.8 Despite the success in curtailing the deficit, the signs point to a weakening fiscal 
situation.  Domestic revenue growth has been offset by an equivalent growth of regular 
expenditure.  With the continuation of the insurgency, security expenditures continue to rise.  
External aid has been unstable, in part reflecting domestic political instability.  The 
government has used the development budget as the cushion to absorb the fiscal shocks 
because of the growth of expenditure due to security and salary increases and lower than 
anticipated foreign financing.  Fiscal adjustment to these shocks will cause development 
expenditure to fall to 6.6 percent of GDP in FY05, 30 percent lower than budgeted.  
  
2.9 Ironically, the development budget is shrinking even as its effectiveness as a 
development tool is being improved.  While maintaining fiscal discipline at the aggregate 
level, the budget pathologies of the past – unrealistic budgets, absence of links between 
annual plan and the budget or outputs to sectoral strategy – have been partly corrected with 
the implementation of PRS anchored by application of MTEF principles to the development 
budget.  Despite these improvements, it must be acknowledged that there continues to be a 
problem of under-spending relative to planned development expenditure – averaging 29 
percent from FY01 to FY05.  The shortfall of actual versus the budget is increasing for the 
social sectors and reflects, in part, the shortfalls in external aid inflows relative to budget 
projections. 
 
2. 10 As domestic financing of development declines, the government has become more 
dependent on (unpredictable) foreign financing.  Aid dependence of the development 
budget has increased from 46 percent in FY02 to 58  percent in FY05 and projected to be 64 
percent in FY 06.  On average 38 percent of budgeted aid does not materialize. Non-
availability of aid funds reduces the level of development expenditure in general and capital 
expenditure in particular. In the absence of large savings through further rationalization of 
development budget activities,
2
 development expenditure outcomes has been lowered by an 
equivalent of foreign financing shortfalls. While there is a need to restrain the growth of 
current expenditure and increase domestically generated financing (revenue plus domestic 
borrowing), the prospects for doing so are limited under current circumstances. The only 
recourse to stem further fall of donor finance availability is through strengthening of the 
PRSP and the specific spending plans associated with it through demonstration of money 
being well spent. To reach this point, concerted efforts need to be made by the government to 
efficiently use committed funds
3
 through budgeting of more implementable components of an 
activity, while development partners need to focus on strengthening predictability of aid 
focusing on efficiency of budget expenditure.   
 
2. 11  The problem of declining “fiscal space” for development is manifested in a 
number of ways.  The most direct impact at present is on development expenditure which 
has been cut repeatedly.  In the current conflict environment, further increases in security 
expenditures will require further cuts in investments and is likely to spill over into cuts on 
maintenance and operations, if it has not already.  Thus, the lack of fiscal space is likely to 
have both short and long term adverse consequences for the ability of government to provide 
public services.  It is also clear that it is difficult to sustain a medium term approach to public 
expenditure management with a high degree of unpredictability in resource levels and ad hoc 
adjustments at the budget execution stage. Given the conflict-influenced difficult 
implementation situation, both the government and its development partners could help 
                                                 
2
 After rationalization, development budget lines increased from  434 in FY 03 to 454 in FY 05. 
3
 Approximate undisbursed IFI’s aid is 8 percent of GDP. 
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matters by making efficient use of available commitments, removing inordinate delays in 
decision-making and relaxing the requirement for counterpart funds. 
 
2.12 The government needs to develop a fiscal strategy:  There are a number of costs to 
not responding aggressively and strategically to the growing fiscal risks.  First, if the financial 
environment is deteriorating in terms of resource levels and degree of unpredictability, it will 
make the financing of key government operations more problematic.  Already it is clear that 
ad hoc adjustments during budget execution are reducing the effectiveness and completion 
rates of public investment projects.  This is likely to worsen.  Second, failure to improve 
government performance in key areas will undermine the government’s ability to retain 
support for its policies, embolden the insurgency and set up a vicious cycle of increased need 
for security expenditures with further adverse implications for other government services.   
 
2.13 There a number of conventional options to addressing this declining fiscal 
situation, some of which are more desirable than others.
4
   First, the government could 
seek to raise domestic revenues.
5
.  Second, the government could try to generate a larger 
amount of external assistance.  This should certainly be a major part of the fiscal strategy, 
both because of the need to boost grant support as well as to improve the predictability of 
flows.  However, it would not be advisable to formulate a fiscal strategy that relies solely on 
this element, given the uncertain political environment and some reluctance of donors to 
commit resources.  At any rate, donors will be looking for a number of indicators of 
commitment to improved governance before they are likely to scale up support to previous 
levels.   
 
2.14 A third option is a significant rationalization of government expenditure which 
eliminates waste and low priority programs and improves efficiency.  This should 
deserve serious consideration both as an efficiency enhancing and commitment signaling 
measure. Beyond the rationalization of development projects undertaken in 2002 (which may 
have been, at least in part, a consolidation of project line items rather than real elimination of 
low priority projects), it is not clear that this avenue has been adequately explored – certainly 
not in the recurrent budget where losses of public enterprises continue to be a potential call 
on the budget.  A recent ADB report (Nepal Public Finance Assessment) made the 
observation that the political leadership, perhaps distracted by other considerations, appears 
not to fully recognize the true difficulty of the fiscal situation.  A proposal for radical 
rationalization of government spending on both recurrent and development programs would 
be one way to both make the reality of this most evident to the political leadership and to 
address the fiscal situation by generating fiscal savings and improving the efficiency of the 
budget.  Furthermore, by demonstrating its political resolve to make the necessary decisions 
to address the growing fiscal strain, the government might also favorably influence its 
development partners to continue and enhance aid flows. 
 
2.15 Finally, a fourth element of the fiscal strategy would be to consider the scope to run 
a larger deficit through domestic borrowing.  This will have to be undertaken with careful 
consideration of the implications for crowding out private sector borrowing, as well as the 
potential implications for public debt levels.  At present the scope for additional borrowing is 
limited by the PRGF agreement.  In principle, borrowing should be part of a fiscal strategy if 
                                                 
4
 The remainder of this section outlines the four key parameters of such a strategy.  More detailed analysis is required to discuss and finalize 
such a strategy. 
5
 The FY 06 Mid Year Fiscal Ordinance has sharply reduced customs duties and shifted emphasis to VAT , as main source of revenue 
collection. 
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it can be used to stimulate the economy or to complete high priority public investments.  
While some fiscal expansion may be necessary given the economic situation, it can only be 
justified if there is a high degree of confidence that such spending will have an economic 
stimulus and development impact. 
 
2.16 Taken together, the government could adopt a fiscal strategy that could show the 
way forward.  A fiscal strategy that is based initially on a significant housecleaning of 
government programs and projects and supplemented by a modest increase in the fiscal 
deficit might create the necessary basis to strengthen government performance and impact on 
the economy.   If this is done with the intention to provide a strong signal of government 
resolve, it would also serve to strengthen the confidence of development partners and create a 
virtuous effect by attracting a larger volume of grant support.  A number of alternative 
scenarios could be developed based on projections of the security environment and donor 
support to enable budget management to minimize the disruptions to government services.  
 
 
3. Policy and Budget Formulation (PRSP and MTEF) 
 
3.1 The deteriorating economic and political environment created the conditions and 
necessity for new initiatives in Nepal in 2000-05.  The PRSP initiative supported by external 
partners provided Nepal with the opportunity to better articulate its policies in support of 
poverty reduction both to confront the insurgency and to revitalize its economy.  And, as 
discussed above, an MTEF process has been introduced. 
 
3.2 In principle, the MTEF argues for attention to all three levels of budget performance – 
aggregate fiscal discipline, allocation to politically defined (and economically sound) 
priorities, and operational efficiency in delivering public services.  While the conceptual 
argument for the MTEF reform is compelling, implementation in each country is a difficult 
and unique challenge since the design and sequencing of the reform must take account of 
initial conditions, including government capacity and quality of leadership of a relatively 
complex institutional change, and management of donor support, to name some of the 
complicating factors.  Nepal has shown remarkable pragmatism in adopting an approach to 
this reform that addresses issues that are seen to be important and achievable. The approach 
that Nepal has taken, a departure from aiming to strengthen all three levels of budget 
performance, is internalization of reform, that too on an incremental basis, staying in line 
with existing implementation capacity focusing first in strengthening first two levels of 
budget performance.  This reform assumes greater significance because it is also critical to a 
strategy that requires enlarging donor assistance in the form of budget support. 
 
Political Engagement in the PRSP and MTEF 
 
3.3 The presumption in most countries is that the political leadership is empowered to 
make resource allocation decisions.  Where these decisions are guided by a policy making 
process we might expect to see allocations according to policy choices made by the 
leadership regarding the role of the state and the priorities for public policy.  However, in 
many countries the political leadership may make ad hoc resource allocation decisions that 
are either not grounded in prior policy analysis or which conflict with stated policy.  Both the 
PRSP and the MTEF serve as mechanisms to discipline the political leadership so that policy 
can be responsive to needs but prioritized by the requirement to abide by a budget constraint. 
In South Africa, Uganda and Albania, the explicit engagement of the political leadership in 
  
 12 
setting strategic priorities for policy and the budget have served to strengthen the credibility 
of policies and the budget. In particular, it facilitated effective cooperation between the 
Cabinet and a legislative body, which restrained opportunistic behavior of the members of 
parliament and allowed the adoption of realistic budgets.  . 
 
3.4 In Nepal, the political leadership appears to have largely neglected its responsibility 
for decisions on policies and priorities.  Technocrats have tended to make decisions on the 
budget framework and priorities with only cursory involvement of the Cabinet.  While this 
has limited the risks due to populist policies, it does suggest a potentially serious weakness in 
institutional arrangements because the political leadership does not have ownership of the 
fiscal framework and the PRSP priorities.   
 
Merging Planning and Policy 
 
3.5 Nepal appears to have succeeded in reviving a moribund planning process to 
support the PRSP.  As in many other countries, development plans in Nepal displayed the 
standard pathology – ambitious goals and targets were set without factoring in resource 
availability so that many sectoral activities were launched but inadequately funded.  The 
result was that projects and programs were poorly implemented and the economic benefits of 
investments were not captured.  Overall, credibility of the plans was gradually diminished.  It 
is, therefore, all the more remarkable that the reforms introduced in the last 2-3 years, guided 
by a highly participatory PRS document has served to revive and make more useful the 
planning process. 
 
3.6 Medium term planning has been linked to the needs of the PRSP.  Unlike some 
countries, Nepal has explicitly recognized the need to reconcile and adapt existing processes 
for policy and plan formulation with the PRSP approach.  By explicitly integrating the PRSP 
with the Tenth Five Year Plan Nepal ensured that the five year plan was made more 
operationally relevant and poverty focused.  By merging the Poverty Reduction Strategy 
Paper (PRSP) with the Tenth Plan, the government has effectively used the economic 
planning capacity to articulate an operational economic strategy.   
 
3.7 At the same time, the PRSP itself avoided the risk of creating a policy process that was 
unconnected to real decision making, or in conflict with policy objectives generated by a 
different process.  Additionally, by adopting the PRSP consultation process, the Plan/PRSP 
has taken a meaningful approach to the poverty reduction goal through appropriately defined 
sector strategies.  Implementation has been given a boost by the adoption of the Immediate 
Action Plan (IAP) of the Government, a “must-complete” list of priority activities that 
strengthens and focuses efforts towards early completion of activities.  By adopting this 
approach, Nepal has avoided the dilemma, faced by a number of countries, which have 
chosen to launch a separate PRSP process and have had to subsequently confront the 
questions of consistency and credibility of two apparently unconnected policy processes. In 
effect, the integration of the planning process and the PRSP has helped improve the allocative 
efficiency of declining donor funding, which has happened in most countries that have 
introduced the PRSP as a parallel process to planning.  Given the importance of aid 
financing, this has been a critical step for alleviating fiscal deterioration. 
 
3.8 The PRSP articulates a four pillar strategy consisting of: (i) broad based pro-poor growth 
; (ii) improved service delivery to rural populations to accelerate social and human 
development; (iii) targeted programs to mainstream inclusive development of marginalized 
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groups/communities, women, and backward regions; and (iv) good governance, to promote 
accountability, transparency, and reduce corruption, and to increase effectiveness of public 
expenditure.   
 
Linking Policy and the Budget 
 
3.9 The integration of the plan and the PRSP has allowed Nepal to also address a key 
challenge for all governments, i.e. to make policy realistic and affordable by forging it with 
the budget through the MTEF (see below).  While the unpredictable shifts in the overall 
resource environment discussed above has limited the impact of reforms in this respect, it is, 
nevertheless, true that a coordinated effort by the Ministry of Finance (MoF) and the National 
Planning Commission (NPC) has allowed greater realism in policy making. 
 
3.10 In this context, it is worthwhile reiterating that the budget reforms in Nepal are best 
understood as pragmatic and necessary adaptations to a deteriorating fiscal and economic 
situation.  The initial impetus of budget reform in 2001 was a growing fiscal deficit.  In a 
context where development expenditures had to be curtailed, the reforms sought to ensure 
that high priority development projects linked to the PRSP were completed expeditiously.  
But broader shifts in allocation in line with PRSP priorities have also been accomplished. 
 
3.11 The MTEF has facilitated significant changes in intra-sectoral allocation in favor of 
human development line with the PRSP.  The development budget is better aligned with 
programs that support human development.  The share of social sector – education, health, 
drinking water and local development – has risen from about 35 percent of actual 
development expenditure in FY02 to 47 percent in FY05.  Within the social sector, the share 
of the education sector has risen from 6 to 13 percent, health from 7 to 9.6 percent, drinking 
water from 6.7 to 7.6 percent and local development from 11.4 to13 percent over the period. 
These four sectors are particularly important for achieving the PRS human development and 
social inclusion goals and emphasize decentralization and community-managed approaches 
to improve delivery and efficiency of public services in rural areas. The prospect of donor 
harmonization has provided a major incentive for the adoption of sector-wide programs in 
education and health. The projected increase in sector budget due to pooling donor funds is 
25 percent for education and 33 percent for health for FY05 (Table 4) . 
 
3.12 Correspondingly, the share of the economic sector including infrastructure has 
been reduced.   Allocation for economic sector has been cut from 26 to 22 percent, while the 
infrastructure sector has been cut from 33 to 28 percent.  Within the economic sector, the 
decline in the share of infrastructure sector, transport and power, is of concern because of its 
impact on medium term growth.  Investment in transport and power sectors have declined 
from 35 percent of development expenditure in FY 99 to 26 percent in FY 05, largely due to 
completion of large projects, shift in donor emphasis from infrastructure to human 
development, and, in on-going projects, the impact of insurgency. While the PRSP has put 
emphasis on rural access and rural electrification, insurgency and donor fund unavailability, 
will dampen large resource shift efforts of the government
6
 in these  two sectors. 
 
                                                 
6
 A 195 million US dollar  hydro power project, in final leg of construction, is facing financial constraints 
resulting into 17 hours per week per household of load shedding . 
  
 14 
FY 1999 FY 2000 FY 2001 FY 2002 FY 2003 FY 2004 FY 2005
Social Services 36.0 39.1 34.7 34.7 43.9 42.0 47.4
   Education 5.8 8.1 7.5 6.2 8.1 10.4 13.3
   Health 5.9 6.7 5.3 6.7 7.0 7.2 9.6
   Drinking Water 6.5 7.6 6.5 6.7 8.6 8.3 7.6
   Local Development 13.9 13.0 12.5 11.4 17.5 12.9 13.0
   Other Social Services 3.9 3.6 2.9 3.8 2.8 3.3 4.0
Economic Services 24.3 25.6 23.5 25.7 23.0 24.3 22.1
   Agriculture 6.8 6.6 6.3 8.1 6.5 5.2 5.4
   Irrigation 10.3 9.6 10.7 10.0 8.1 6.4 6.6
   Forestry 1.7 1.6 1.3 1.8 2.0 1.5 1.4
   Industry 1.0 2.6 1.0 1.6 1.9 1.2 1.0
   Other Econimic Services 4.6 5.2 4.2 4.2 4.5 9.9 7.8
Infrastructure 36.4 33.1 33.5 33.3 29.9 31.4 28.3
   Transportation 17.9 14.8 14.4 12.9 13.0 12.9 12.0
   Communication 1.6 0.9 0.7 1.1 1.9 2.0 2.8
   Power 16.9 17.4 18.4 19.3 15.0 16.5 13.4
Others 3.3 2.2 8.3 6.3 3.3 2.2 2.2
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Memo Item:
Pro-poor Spending (% of Total) 30.3 29.7 28.4 30.6 31.1
 Composition of Development Expenditure, FY 2000 - FY 2005
Table 4.
(In Percent of Total)
Pre-PRS PRS
 
 
3.13 The PRSP has also supported a pro-poor focus.  The pro-poor focus is defined by 
rural sector activities, including rural development (cash crop, livestock, small irrigation, and 
community forest activities), small and micro hydro power, and rural road construction.  
Actual pro-poor expenditure has risen from 30 percent of total expenditure in FY01 to a 
projected 34 percent of total expenditure for FY06.  Box 1 illustrates the growing reliance on 
communities to channel and manage resources, intended for development initiatives as part of 
an explicit strategy to strengthen ownership and impact.  This increasing involvement of 
communities in resource management should be balanced with the ability of the central 
government to run a national PRSP agenda.  In Ghana and Uganda, the emphasis on bottom-
up budgeting has resulted in “projectization” that has undermined the implementation of 
comprehensive development programs. 
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3.14 Despite the unpredictable resource environment, the implementation of the MTEF 
protected funds for PRS priorities. The institutional capacity limitation and the need to 
pace budgetary reform led to the MTEF confining its coverage to five major ministries 
initially. But, with evidence of fiscal pressures in FY02, the MTEF was extended to all 
ministries and sectors and adopted as basis for the implementation of PRSP in FY02/03. In 
the fourth year of the MTEF implementation, the achievements of this budgetary reform are 
several (Table 5), namely: a) to attempt a realistic definition of the medium term budget 
constraint through the MTEF forecasts; b) to link plan to a realistic budget by dropping non-
performing activities (which were reduced from 633 budget lines in FY02 to 434 budget lines 
in FY03) ensuring increased allocations to priority one activities (which were increased from 
122 million to 143 million between FY03 and FY05); c) to allocate the assured cash budget 
to priority projects; d) introduction of performance based release system to facilitate better 
implementation,  which improved from low of 62 percent in FY01 to 73 percent in FY05.  
Excluding the two large projects, Malamchee Drinking Water and Marshyangdhi 
Hydroelectric, which have security and implementation-related problems, the completion 
rate
7
 increased to 80 percent.   Despite these improvements, other exogenous changes have 
limited improved execution of the development budget.  The projected low expenditure for 
this fiscal year (FY05), in addition to implementation difficulties, is the result of major 
                                                 
7
 Actual expenditure out-turn compared to original approved budget. 
Box 1. 
Development Space: Community Control 
The increased efforts of HMG/N to develop activities and funds to communities have resulted as 
response to the threats of the insurgency on development. The government strongly believes that 
service delivery be enhanced only if communities are empowered to control development activities 
that affect their lives. Prior to the implementation of the PRS, communities controlled less than 1.5 
percent of the total expenditure. It increased to 4 percent in 2003/04, and the allocation for 2004/05 
has been further increased to 6 percent of total budget. The amount of money controlled and spent 
by the communities has not only grown, but from 2003/03 it has actually surpassed the central grant 
amounts spent by the local governments.  
The experience so far, therefore, 
suggests that truly community-
owned development initiatives are 
more likely to be protected by the 
people compared with projects 
where the ownership levels and 
participation are lower than the 
ideal. In many of the truly 
community-owned and managed 
programs, the people have managed 
to negotiate the ‘development space’ 
needed to continue activities 
(Poverty Alleviation Fund; schools 
under School Management Committees; drinking water schemes under Rural Drinking Water Fund 
Board; and road maintenance under Road Board Fund) suggesting that the approach ahs greater 
resilience and could, therefore, be useful to duplicate for giving continuity to development despite 
the insurgency.  
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political disruptions (two changes in government within a year) and the non-availability of 
donor funds.  
FY 01/02 FY 02/03 FY 03/04 FY  04/05 FY 05/06
 A: Budget realism ( Rs. Billion)
51
MTEF 1 39 ( Budget) 43 49
MTEF 2 42(Budget) 45 51
MTEF 3 47 (Budget) 52.9
MTEF 4 52 (Budget)
Budget Predictability
 I. Increase in Budget
Budget lines - Development Budget 633 434 443 454 411
Allocation per project (Rs. Million) 80 89 95 104 126
Priority one allocation per project ( Rs. million) 123 147 144 163
II. Tied to Cash Budget ( Rs. Billion)
   Cash Budget - Development 25.0 30.0 34.0 38
   Priority One Budget 23.0 30.0 36.0 41
III. Performance ( in percent)
   A: Development Budget 62.0 75.0 74.0 73.0
   B: Development Budget without 
       Melamchi and Marshyangdi 82.0 80.00 76 ( Estimate)
   C: Priority One projects 69 76 76
Development Budget Performance in Successive MTEF FY 2002-2005
Table 5.
 
3.15  Budget Framework:  Over the past decade, Nepal has overhauled the legal 
framework for the budget. The Constitution provides a framework for estimates of 
government revenue, expenditures, financial allocations, management, and monitoring and 
financial procedures.  The 1996 “Budget Preparation Directive” issued by the MoF, marked 
the beginning of a concerted effort by the Government to institutionalize the process of 
making the budget transparent and accountable.  Since then two amendments to the Budget 
Preparation Directive have overhauled or introduced: (i) policy and legal frameworks related 
to the budget formulation process; (ii) medium term outlook and classification of income and 
expenditures; (iii) budget formulation tables, explanations and responsibilities; (iv) guidelines 
for prioritization of expenditures; and (v) guidelines for estimation of income and 
expenditure.  These directives provide the basis for line ministries to prepare the annual plans 
and budget for the next fiscal year and two forward years of the MTEF. 
 
3.16 Budget Process:  At the outset, an explicit fiscal framework sets the basis for budget 
preparation.  The fiscal framework is agreed by the Resource Committee
8
 and commences the 
annual budgetary process.  The technical leadership of the NPC/MoF sends out the sectoral ceiling 
along with budget directives to the line ministries to prepare the annual plans for budget discussion. 
As noted earlier, it appears that at this initial stage of the budget process, there is no effort to garner 
explicit political endorsement by the Cabinet of the budget framework.  Second, at the line ministry 
level, although the Budget Directive provides comprehensive guidance including budget 
formulation tables and forms and with regard to expenditure prioritization, the line ministries 
find it difficult to collate all district level demands within the timetable.
9
  An additional 
problem for line ministries is the inability to confirm donor commitments at the budget 
                                                 
8
 Institutions represented at the Resource Committee are: National Planning Commission, Ministry of Finance 
and Nepal Rastra Bank (Central Bank). Fiscal framework is guided by PRGF. 
9
 All funds in contingency budget line are appropriated to designated budget line upon commitment of funds and 
annual plans agreed with NPC/MoF.  To this extent, budget is very transparent and –currently- subsequent  
budgets have lower contingency budget.  
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Box 2. 
Extra-Budgetary Channel Aid 
 
It is difficult to gauge just exactly how much of foreign assistance that is disbursed in Nepal is spent 
through mechanisms outside the budget. But the difference between ODA disbursements recorded in 
OECD’s Development Assistance Committee (DAC) databases and the aid disbursements shown in 
HMGN’s official budgetary data provide us with a crude proxy to measure off-budget aid. The DAC 
definition of ODA includes grants or 
loans which are undertaken by the 
official sector, with promotion of 
economic development and welfare 
as the main objective, and on 
concessional financial terms (in the 
case of a loan, it should have a grant 
element of at least 25 percent) ODA 
data are provided in current US 
dollars and the annual average of the 
exchange rates reported in official 
HMGN sources were used to convert 
disbursed amounts into current 
rupees. As evident from Figure 1, 
ODA disbursements have been 
consistently higher than the aid 
disbursements accounted for in the 
government budgetary data. In 2003, 
for example, for every dollar of aid was spent through the budget, $1.3 was spent through extra-
budgetary channels. Considered over the 29-year period between 1975 and 2003, ODA disbursements 
have been higher than aid disbursements through the budget by 60 percent. 
 
Source: Sailesh Tiwari, Bank staff. 
Aid Recorded in Buget vs. ODA Disbursement
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preparation stage.  As noted earlier, the unpredictability of donor funds is a major contributor 
to downstream problems in budget implementation. 
 
3.17 Budget coverage must be improved to support budget formulation.  A lack of 
comprehensive coverage of public resources and expenditures is often a handicap to budget 
formulation and effective application of the MTEF.  In Nepal, the existence of a number of 
extra-budgetary revolving funds, as well as a significant amount of external technical 
assistance not channeled through the budget implies inadequate coverage that weakens 
resource allocation and budget discipline (Box 2).  Poor management of off-budget activities 
can create fiscal risks for the budget.  At a minimum, such funds can soften budget 
constraints and cause agencies to continue with activities that are contrary to the objectives of 
public policy.  The prevalence of domestic off-budget arrangements is often a reason for poor 
coverage.  Another reason may be that donor financing is poorly reported and factored into 
the budget framework because reliable information is not provided by donors. A review of 
the MTEF experiences in several African countries noted that most countries had only 
partially integrated donor resources into the MTEF because donor disbursements retained an 
element of unpredictability.  While Ghana, Tanzania, and Uganda appeared to have had 
greater success in integrating donor financing into the budget framework, Benin, Burkina 
Faso and Cameroon have achieved partial coverage of external financing.
10
 
 
 
                                                 
10
 Holmes and Evans (2003). 
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3.18 Several activities are currently underway to improve coverage and reporting of 
donor financing.  The introduction of imprest accounts for some donors for withdrawal of 
funds to carry out agreed activities and require reporting of such expenditure during the fiscal 
year is expected to improve the coverage and reporting of such off-budget line items.  It, 
nevertheless, would be helpful for Nepal to undertake a concerted effort to improve the 
coverage of external financing in the budget framework
11
 that will also allow subjecting 
donor-funded activities to the greater scrutiny of the sectoral priorities.  The experience of a 
number of countries suggests that there has been a limited questioning of existing policies by 
the governments, and donors have only compounded this “add-on” mentality. Overall, this 
effort will help more effectively engage donors in the country’s policy and budget 
formulation cycles, as well as ensure an on-going dialogue between the Government and 
donor community to avoid discrete interventions and to move to a more strategic approach in 
the selection of donor projects. 
 
3.19 Unpredictable aid flows weaken budget formulation and disrupt budget execution.  
Given the large unpredictability due to donor finance, which translates into significant 
unpredictability in delivering a prepared budget, the problems affecting budget performance 
are often perceived as downstream problems of management of uncertain cash flows.  
External project aid is typically earmarked to designated activities and any delay in 
disbursement potentially affects funding of those activities as well as adversely affects overall 
budget implementation. In the short run, the impact of such delays can be cushioned through 
an effective treasury system that uses short term borrowing to moderate cash flow problems.  
However, it is clear that Nepal faces not just problems in the timing of aid flows but broader 
shocks to levels and sharp year-to-year decline and cash management is inadequate to address 
problems of that magnitude.  A strategy to improve the predictability of aid would be critical 
to improving upstream budget formulation and to minimize the problems of downstream 
budget execution. The fact that donor-financed projects often tie up resources for a number of 
years upfront reinforces the importance of integrating such projects in the MTEF planning. 
 
3.20 Project implementation could be improved through timely work planning.  Not all 
problems of budget execution are due to cash flow problems.  A considerable part of the 
fiscal year is lost because of delays in reviewing and approving work plans for projects.  As a 
result, only a part of the year is available to disburse funds and the attempt to squeeze 
expenditure into the last trimester of the fiscal year often leads to poor quality spending as 
well as underperformance relative to the budget.  Annual work plans should be prepared 
shortly after budget negotiations and should be finalized soon after the budget is approved by 
Parliament.  An earlier approval of the work plan in the fiscal year would allow ministries to 
strengthen project implementation and make more effective use of available funds over the 
fiscal year.  Work plans should reflect the feasibility and implementability of activities each 
of the trimester, taking into account the geography of project site, seasonality, security, and 
other factors, as well as a realistic schedule for tendering and contracting of activities.   
 
3.21 Nepal should continue to be pragmatic in its approach to reforms.  References to 
undertake activity based costing may be problematic as a high cost reform that may divert the 
government from other more effective, less capacity-intensive interventions.  Given the 
experience of the city of Bogota (see box 3) a less sophisticated approach may be more 
                                                 
11
 In 2002, Tanzania reported a significant increase in reported revenue after launching an effort to more 
comprehensively record aid flows. 
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realistic for Nepal, as swamping the departments with the cost information would be 
counterproductive given technical capacity constraints.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3.22 Pragmatism would be particularly important in considering performance based 
reforms.  Introduction and development of performance budgeting is a problematic area. The 
experience of both developing and OECD countries indicates that it requires a substantial 
technical capacity and a long time to design a balanced system that links classification 
structures, performance information and budgetary outcomes.  Linking performance and 
resource information, although important, needs to be taken with a caution. Without viable 
monitoring mechanisms and reliable financial and non-financial information, the allocation of 
scarce budget resources may, in effect, discriminate against high-value projects while 
favoring those that have a low value.  
Box 3 Performance Based Budget Reforms 
 
Within Latin America, the Municipal Government of Bogota (capital of Colombia) attempted to 
introduce systematic program costing as a basis for an MTEF.  An official who was intimately involved 
in the MTEF development process admitted in a seminar that adoption of the activity-based costing was 
the most technically challenging aspect of the MTEF development and noted that the lack of trained 
staff and integrated financial management systems proved to be big obstacles to reform.  He cautioned 
the seminar participants against facile adoption of such a technique.   
 
Rather than adopting sophisticated methods which face implementation problems, more rough and ready 
methods may serve the purpose of projecting future costs.  The Chilean approach of “competitive 
bidding fund” builds on somewhat simpler projection of blocks of expenditure items (medium-term 
financial programming), and estimation of total revenue capacities over the medium term.  The system 
then focuses on strategic prioritization by providing the political decision-makers systematically 
screened project/program proposals.   
 
Source: Yasuhiko Matsuda, Bank staff. 
